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Abstract
The emergence and spread of drug resistance is draining available resources and threatening our ability to treat 
infectious diseases in developing countries. Countering drug resistance requires pharmaceutical companies, 
government regulators, doctors, and patients to make difficult choices about drug treatment in order to balance 
efficacy, cost, safety, and sustainability of drugs. These complex tradeoffs are faced along the drug supply 
chain from the development of new products, procurement of drugs for donor and government distribution, 
distribution steps to ensure treatment heterogeneity along with quality and availability, and dispensing and 
use that requires affordability, patient adherence and rational use of drugs and diagnostics. An analysis of 
the incentives and risks in the drug supply chain reflects that many stakeholders who can influence optimal 
prescribing of existing drugs; affect higher patient compliance; and ensure the quality of drugs have weak 
incentives to carry out these activities optimally. This implies a high potential for drug resistance to accelerate. 
This paper recommends specific measures to better align the incentives of these stakeholders with resistance-
countering activities. 
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When global supply chains work, they can be miracles of efficiency and innovation, 
making both those at the top and the bottom better off.  But when they fail, the negative 
consequences can be profound for all who wish to sell, buy, and use the products.  
Nowhere is this more evident than in the global supply chain for drugs and diagnostic 
products. 
 
The importance of understanding the supply chain for drugs and diagnostics has been a 
key part of the work undertaken by an expert working group that CGD convened in late 
2007 to examine the global problem of drug resistance.  In this working paper, 
commissioned by CGD to inform the development of the working group’s 
recommendations, Professor Prashant Yadav, MIT/Zaragoza, undertakes a supply chain 
analysis of drugs and diagnostics. The paper focuses on the ways in which incentives 
within the supply chain relationships protect (or fail to protect) drug efficacy.   
 
Through structured interviews and independent analysis, Professor Yadav finds that drug 
and diagnostic supply chain incentive misalignments affect drug markets in developing 
countries. Among them are differences between generic and branded pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to protect drug efficacy, moderate incentives for procurement agencies to 
seek the lowest prices possible, and weak prescriber incentives to adopt diagnostics.  
Multiple opportunities exist for a better alignment of incentives to protect drug efficacy 
in the developing world. 
 
In his look across products, and up and down the supply chain, Professor Yadav gives us 
a whole new perspective not only on what some of the fundamental problems are, but on 
how specific changes in business practices might make it possible to harness the power of 
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The emergence and spread of drug resistance is draining available resources and threatening 
our ability to treat infectious diseases in developing countries. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, diarrhea and respiratory tract infections continue to be the leading causes of death in 
many developing countries, many of which have already been exacerbated by resistance. 
Countering drug resistance often involves complex tradeoffs between activities such as the 
development of new products; ensuring treatment heterogeneity; and guaranteeing quality 
and ensuring systemic availability, affordability, compliance, adherence and rational use of 
drugs and diagnostics. A careful understanding of all the players involved in the resistance 
problem and their incentives to engage in activities that counter drug resistance is crucial for 
policy-makers and resource managers in a range of institutions and agencies. This paper 
presents results gathered through quasi-structured interviews to understand these incentives 
and develop recommendations to better align them with resistance-countering activities. 
 
Consistent with various earlier studies, this analysis finds that pharmaceutical and large 
biotech companies have weak incentives to pay adequate attention to the impact of drug 
resistance or to develop new resistance friendly technologies and narrow spectrum 
antibiotics, especially those focused towards the developing world. Smaller biotech 
companies and large generic manufacturers have better incentives to develop and market 
these technologies. Many large generic manufacturers who are now zealous to enter into the 
innovation space are more willing to take risks on technologies with smaller market size if 
they can find opportunities to in-license such products. However, at present, there exists no 
clear platform to help facilitate such technology transfer. A “science clearing house” which 
helps unearth all early stage candidates that have some resistance susceptibility benefits and 
shares this information with interested biotechs, smaller pharmaceutical companies and large 
generic manufacturers will facilitate the creation of a bigger portfolio of anti-infectives and 
other technologies.  
 
Many stakeholders who can influence optimal prescribing of existing drugs, affect higher 
patient compliance and ensure the quality of drugs currently have weak incentives or limited 
capacity to do so.  Most notably, private dispensers and clinics that play an important role in 
providing diagnosis, the right drug, and appropriate dosing advice for large sections of the 
population in the developing world do not internalize any of the social costs of drug 
resistance, and therefore have weak incentives to carry out these activities optimally. Drug 
regulatory authorities have the mandate and incentives to ensure that drug quality is high 
across the supply chain and good dispensing practices are followed at all points of drug 
dispensing. However, their reach and capacity to monitor a fast-growing market of private 
providers is fairly limited in most developing countries. This paper recommends specific 
measures to enhance their capacity. 
 
In many countries, drug dispensing franchising and accreditation have emerged (albeit on a 
small scale) which help maintain consistent quality standards through large networks of 
geographically dispersed drug outlets. Franchise and accreditation models are scalable ways 
to ensure that the choice of drugs, the quality of drugs, and the dispensing and dosing 
practices are optimal, in order to counter drug resistance. This paper recommends the 2 
 
creation of a global umbrella organization which sets the “meta operating principles” for 
quality-accredited networks and ensures that quality drugs are dispensed rationally. 
 
Other recommendations include improving the use of diagnostic technologies; collecting 
data on the volumes of anti-infectives sold; and educating national, social or employer-run 
insurance and revolving drug fund managers in developing countries on the causes and 




The emergence and spread of drug resistance is draining available resources and threatening 
our ability to treat infectious diseases in developing countries. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, diarrhea and respiratory tract infections continue to be the leading causes of death in 
many developing countries.  For many of these diseases, the emergence of resistance against 
first-line treatments has forced us to switch to more expensive second or third-line agents 
which prevent resource-constrained countries and health programs from expanding access to 
life-saving treatments. In some instances, international financing agencies have come to the 
rescue by providing financing support to developing countries for procuring these expensive 
medicines. However, this is an unsustainable band-aid, and resistance against second and 
third-line treatments may also emerge, leaving us without treatment options for some of the 
most deadly infectious diseases.  
 
The development of resistance is a complex phenomenon with multiple causative factors.  
Many strategies exist to prevent or contain the emergence of resistance, and, broadly 
speaking, they can be categorized into two types:  
i)  Creating incentives that encourage pharmaceutical and biotech companies to 
develop new drugs to treat infectious diseases and to pay adequate attention to 
the impact of drug resistance.  
ii)  Ensuring optimal use of existing drugs through prescriber awareness, higher 
patient compliance and ensuring drug quality. 
 
Drug resistance has been studied as an economic problem with many facets, such as: 
information asymmetry about its causes, impacts and costs; negative externalities in costs 
arising from resistance; and incentive coordination among multiple stake-holders. Previous 
research (Laxminarayan 2002) acknowledges that drug resistance is a problem of missing 
incentives among multiple players.  Cost and decision economics play an important role in 
drug resistance; for example, the type of drug (good quality vs. counterfeit, combination vs. 
mono therapy) a patient obtains at the point of dispensing is dependent upon various cost 
and health financing factors that pay little heed to drug resistance. Similarly, stock-outs of 
drugs at the facilities and hospitals and poor functioning of the overall health system also 
strongly exacerbate the drug resistance problem. Stocking decisions for drugs at the 
pharmacy and drug store are determined by the cost economics of bearing the expiration 
and wastage risk from stocking more expensive drugs or stocking cheaper (thus in some 
cases counterfeit) drugs.  
 
Countering drug resistance often involves complex tradeoffs between activities such as the 
development of new products, ensuring treatment heterogeneity, guaranteeing product and 
treatment quality, ensuring systemic availability and affordability of drugs, and adherence and 
rational use of medicines.   The challenge for policymakers is to identify the points of 
highest leverage and understand the many actors involved, in order to ensure the acceptance 
and success of any intervention designed to counter the problem of increasing drug 
resistance. Hence, a careful understanding of the incentives of all players involved in the 
resistance problem can help policy-makers and resource managers in a range of institutions 
and agencies formulate effective strategies.  
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This paper draws from basic decision theory and a set of quasi-structured interviews to 
understand these incentives and develop recommendations.  Through this analysis we seek 
to answer some (not all) of the open questions, such as: 
•  How do drug procurement, international financing, health systems strengthening and 
health policy impact drug resistance? 
•  What economic determinants influence inappropriate dosing at the prescriber, 
dispenser and patient level? How do drug price and facility user fees impact drug 
resistance? 
•  How does the use of private sector dispensing to enhance access impact drug 
resistance? 
•  What incentives issues are preventing appropriate diagnosis before drug dispensing? 
What is preventing access to improved rapid diagnostics for infections? 
•  What incentives are needed for pharmaceutical companies to expand research in the 
discovery of new chemical entities for infectious diseases? 
•  How can drug resistance considerations be included in the earlier stages of drug 




This paper is an initial exercise intended to clarify thinking about this problem and should be 
viewed in that context. The focus of the study is on infectious diseases in developing 
countries.  The study has centered more on product distribution than on service provision 
aspects of the supply chain, so the recommendations and focus of the study will reflect that.  
Admittedly, the individual behavioral aspects are far more complex, and viewing the product 
supply chain in isolation may lead to a myopic picture of the issues and solutions.  Also, this 
paper does not explicitly address policies that reduce the spread of infection such as 
traditional hygiene and infection control measures in hospital settings. 
 
Approach and Methodology 
Many decisions across the supply chain, ranging from new drug development to improper 
usage by the end-patient, impact the emergence of drug resistance, and many distinct 
organizations and players are involved in making these decisions. We define a “socially 
optimal outcome” to be the set of decisions at each stage in the supply chain for drugs that 
minimize the emergence of drug resistance in society as a whole.  
 
There are several possible explanations for why each player may deviate from making 
socially optimal decisions:  
i)  Players may not be able to evaluate the socially optimal decisions, because they 
lack the necessary knowledge or information to make those optimal choices (we 
term these informational blind-spots).  
ii)  Alternatively, players may knowingly deviate from the social optimum, because 
they do not internalize all of the costs in their decision making process (incentive 
misalignments arising to failure to internalize a cost). 
iii)  Real-life incentive systems tend to reward good immediate outcomes (e.g. lower 
stock outs of drugs) rather than good long-term decisions (such as maintaining 5 
 
an assortment of drugs that may lead to decreased resistance). Given that future 
rewards are heavily discounted as compared to current benefits, delayed 
emergence of resistance is not rewarded in the incentive structures of most 
operational players.  (incentive misalignments arising from faulty future vs. 
current reward discounting) 
 
In some instances, the reluctance to deviate from current norms can adversely impact                                          
decisions regarding various activities pertinent to drug resistance. Also, interviews have 
revealed that there exist “procedural blind-spots” where decisions makers believe they are 
procedurally constrained from making particular decisions, but in reality, it is not the case. 
Figure 1 below depicts how all of these factors impact decision making. 
 

















Each of the different reasons for deviating from the optimal decision can be mitigated in 
different ways. i) above can be addressed through better dissemination of information 
related to the causes of drug resistance and employing a method to counter them (See Back 
forthcoming for a detailed discussion of this). ii)  requires a careful economic analysis of 
each of the decision points that directly or indirectly affect drug resistance. iii) can be 
addressed to some extent by creating a stronger reputational risk for the economic actors 
involved through civil society and public awareness campaigns that address the issue of drug 
resistance. Creating an environment in which reputational damage from dishonorable 
dealings would jeopardize long term profits would prevent self-interested short-term profit 
maximizing actors from squeezing the last dollar of profit out of their current transactions.  
 
This study first identified the key stakeholders and a set of activities that help to counter 
drug resistance.  These were identified based on secondary research, expert interviews and 
deliberations of the Center for Global Development Drug Resistance Working Group 











Future vs. current reward 









Box 1: Activities to Counter Drug Resistance 
•  Access (availability, affordability & acceptability) to a wider range of (new and innovative) drugs1 
•  Proper diagnosis and optimal prescribing 
•  Research better dosing regimens for existing drugs2 
•  Lower production cost versions of existing drugs 
•  Selection, procurement, prescribing and use of only high quality drugs 
•  Adherence to full dosage, drug regimen and rational use 
•  Infection prevention in clinical and non-clinical settings 
•  Development of new vaccines and transmission-blocking technologies 
 
For each of these activities, the decision process of each category of stakeholders was 
assessed based on interviews with a variety of organizations. Quasi-structured phone and in-
person interviews (rather than formal surveys) were used, because the former provide greater 
flexibility, allowing the respondent to bring up new issues. Fourteen in-depth interviews 
were conducted between March and September 2008 wherein respondents were asked how 
they make key decisions related to the activities identified. All interviews were conducted by 
the investigators themselves. A similar methodology has been used in previous studies of 
health care value chains (Yadav and Williams 2005; Yadav, Sekhri and Curtis 2007; Lalvani, 
Yadav, Curtis, Oomman and Bernstein 2008). This approach enabled the partitioning of a 
complex problem into a number of sub-problems, each representing the decisions and 
objectives of a distinct player/organization. 
Based on an assessment of the decision process, the incentives of stake-holders in each 
category were classified into: disincentive, weak incentive, medium incentive and strong 














                                                 
1 A wider range includes new chemical entities (using similar or different pathways) , combination 
therapies and enhancements to remaining half life etc. of existing drugs 
 
2 Some research suggests that more intensive and shorter interval doses of anti-infectives may 
be beneficial for preventing the emergence and spread of resistance. Such research is in many 
cases limited to antibiotics (Lipsitch and Samore 2002). There is greater need for understanding 












A map of stakeholders involved in the value chain for pharmaceuticals was created in order 
to understand which actors impact decisions pertaining to drug resistance. Manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals were sub-categorized into generic, innovative originator and non-GMP 
generic manufacturers, as their decision processes and incentive structures are very different. 
Procurement agents are organizations such as UNICEF, IDA, IAPSO, Mission Pharma, and 
Crown Agents that procure drugs on behalf of national programs and ministries of health. 
These agents act as a key link between manufacturers and purchasers of pharmaceutical 
products in many developing countries. The buyers of drugs from manufacturers or 
procurement agents are divided into public, private and mission to reflect the differences in 
their decision and incentive structures. The products flow from the buyers to the point of 
prescribing or dispensing through a distribution channel consisting of regional warehouses 
and wholesalers. A broad variety of dispensing points such as public hospitals/ clinics, 
mission hospitals, private clinics, pharmacies, drug shops and informal outlets were studied 
and included in the analysis. National and supranational drug regulatory authorities such as 
the WHO Prequalification program have a key role in ensuring high drug quality and proper 8 
 
drug selection for a country. Global technical agencies are institutions such as the WHO 
which provide technical guidance and set reference standards on treatment guidelines and 
help define essential drug lists for countries. Financing organizations such as the World 
Bank, the Global Fund and bi-lateral donors provide financing for drug procurement and 
health system improvement and, thus, are also key players who may impact drug resistance. 
2 Decision Influencers and Incentives  
For each stakeholder identified in the previous section, decision models were elicited using 
the interview methodology described earlier. These decision models, along with incentive 




Manufacturers of innovative drugs, vaccines (and to some extent diagnostic technologies) 
use a decision model driven primarily by the size of the market opportunity and the risks of 
failure of a technology. In addition, manufacturers responded that the degree that market 
competition increases their costs of market penetration, especially in markets where the drug 
candidate is only an improvement on an available dosing regimen. On the other hand, higher 
risks of failure weighed against a small market size and prevent companies from developing 
new classes of products that are significantly different from existing products in their 
mechanisms of treatment. 
 
Chart 2: Originator Manufacturer’s Decision Model 
 
The low price per treatment that a manufacturer can charge due to affordability and 
corporate responsibility pressures for products targeted for the developing world makes this 
decision process not work in favor of new, innovative drugs or vaccines for infectious 
diseases, unless they have a reasonable market in high income countries. For antibiotics in 9 
 
particular, the low reimbursement for antibiotic treatment in high-income countries also 
undermines incentives to produce new, innovative products. Although longer patent 
durations may help marginally tilt the decision model in favor of development of new classes 
of drugs and vaccines for infectious diseases, this would not necessarily alleviate the broader 
problem. Originator manufacturers also internalize the risks from poor quality products 
being dispensed downstream in the supply chain. In environments where this risk is high, 
this impacts their choice of channels for distribution and may lead to a lack of competition 
in the distribution channels and, in some cases, a product being handed-over to a third party 
importer/ agent at an early stage in the supply chain. In some instances, Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) acts as a driver to balance profit-based decision models which have led 
to a few isolated large investments in the development of drugs targeted for infectious 
diseases of the developing world (e.g. Coartem from Novartis). However, pharmaceutical 
companies do not see big CSR benefits from out-licensing early stage compounds which 
may have benefits from a resistance standpoint. On the other hand, out-licensing (even if at 
early stage) does have its associated legal and contractual costs; and hence, the incentives for 
a pharmaceutical company to seek such opportunities are very weak. For somewhat similar 
reasons, they have poor incentives to work with partners on developing co-formulated 
products. Pharmaceutical companies may limit the list of indications/symptoms for which 
an anti-infective product can be dispensed and can also educate the channel about these 
indications. This can have a real impact on countering resistance, but they do not have the 
incentives for expending effort and resources on this activity. 
 
Table 1: Incentives of Originator Manufacturers 
Development of new drugs*/vaccines  WEAK 
Development of enhanced versions of existing drugs  WEAK 
Development of co-formulated products with partners  WEAK 
Out-licensing early stage compounds with resistance benefits WEAK 
Ensuring consistent high quality across the supply chain  MEDIUM 
Influencing optimal prescribing and proper diagnosis MEDIUM 
Educating for rational use   MEDIUM 
Reducing prices of new or existing drugs  WEAK 
Reserving a product for future use    WEAK 
* Note that we specifically refer to the incentives for drugs/vaccines targeted towards infectious diseases with a 
higher prevalence in the developing world  
Generic Manufacturers 
Manufacturers of generic products have a slightly different decision model. They evaluate a 
potential generic drug based on size of market, cost of penetration and the cost of acquiring 
the technology. The costs related to marketing approval/registration of a generic product 
(chemical or bio-equivalence studies, dossier submission etc.) in each country are considered 
a significant cost by many generic manufacturers. While there are many innovative 
manufacturers that also have generic products in their portfolio, in such cases we refer only 





Chart 3: Generic Manufacturer’s Decision Model 
 
 
Many large generic manufacturers are keen to get into pharmaceutical classes that have been 
traditionally dominated by big pharmaceutical companies. They have little experience 
registering and obtaining marketing approvals and are willing to get on the learning curve by 
in-licensing late or mid-stage compounds which originator companies do not find attractive. 
They are willing to do this even for products with small revenue potential solely for the 
benefit of gaining this experience and then leveraging the knowledge to demonstrate 
credibility as an innovative drug manufacturer. In many cases, generic manufacturers have 
strong sales forces in low income countries and want to expand the portfolio of products 
that their sales rep promotes on each physician or dispenser visit.
3 The case of Aspen 
Pharma in South Africa is worth studying in detail for this purpose. 
South Africa-based Aspen Pharmaceuticals is Africa's largest pharmaceutical manufacturer 
and has businesses in South Africa, Australasia, India, East Africa and also exports across 
the globe. Aspen is also a leading global player in generic anti-retrovirals. In June 2008, 
Aspen acquired four core branded GlaxoSmithkline (GSK) products – Eltroxin, Imuran, 
Lanoxin and Zyloric – which provided Aspen an opportunity to learn more about the 
process of IP in-licensing. For GSK it provided an opportunity to recover some value from 
off-patent IP. Similar models can be used for out-licensing of products with small market 
potential for large pharmaceutical companies but are still good candidates for generic 
manufacturers. 
                                                 
3 Sales forces of generic manufacturers (and also innovative manufacturers) in low income environments 
target pharmacies and wholesaler establishment over the conventional developed country model of 






Table 2: Incentives of Generic Manufacturers 
Development of new drugs/vaccines  N/A 
Development of enhanced versions of existing drugs  MEDIUM 
Development of co-formulated products with partners  N/A 
In-licensing mid to late-stage compounds with resistance benefits STRONG 
Ensuring consistent high quality across the supply chain  MEDIUM 
Influencing optimal prescribing and proper diagnosis WEAK 
Educating for rational use   MEDIUM 
Reducing prices of new or existing drugs  STRONG 
Reserving a product for future use    N/A 
 
Non-GMP generic manufacturers 
Generic manufacturers in developing countries which are not fully GMP compliant have a 
very different decision model as compared to innovative and GMP generic manufacturers. 
 










For the non-GMP manufacturer, the driving factors are the extent of the affordability gap in 
the prices for drugs produced by GMP manufacturers, the ease of the manufacturing process 
and the risks of potential legal liability in the country of sales.  All three of these can be 
successfully used to drive non-GMP manufacturers out of the market or help them graduate 
to becoming GMP manufacturers.  
Procurement agents 
Procurement agents act as vital link between manufacturers and the aggregated buyers 
(national governments, importers) of drugs in developing countries. As such they can play a 12 
 
key role in advising countries on drug and supplier choice, impact of drug variety and 
heterogeneity, etc.; however, their current role remains purely of transaction processing and 
does not include full service provision.  
 














In addition, maintaining a larger variety of drugs in their catalog requires them to establish 
relationships with multiple manufacturers and suppliers which requires greater transactional 
cost. While their incentive structures are not necessarily geared to favor maintaining 
relationships with multiple suppliers, customer service considerations lead them to do so. 
 
Table 3: Incentives of Procurement Agents  
Negotiate lower prices with manufacturers  MEDIUM 
Select quality suppliers and conduct pre-shipment inspection  STRONG 
Maintain relationships with multiple suppliers for each product  MEDIUM 
Disseminate information and technical assistance to countries on 





Pharmaceuticals are second only to salaries as the most significant proportion of government 
and private out-of-pocket expenditures in most low and middle-income countries. Total 
pharmaceutical expenditures are up to 40% of the health care budget in many countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, ministries of health have a very involved decision process to select 
                                                 
4 In tune with guidelines set by global technical agencies such as WHO 13 
 
drugs to be included in the national health programs.  Price comparisons, budget availability 
and recommendations from global technical agencies drive the drug selection process. The 
useful life of a recommended therapy is also used in the selection process. However, there 
are clear costs resulting from drug heterogeneity whereas the benefits of heterogeneity are 
not clear or have a future discounting problem. The cost of heterogeneity include higher 
prices from suppliers, need for higher buffer stock and the cost of training health workers 
on the recommended prescribing algorithm if there is drug heterogeneity. 
 


















The value from increased treatment heterogeneity is a global benefit that is not fully 
internalized by the national buyers. The presence of significant costs due to treatment 
heterogeneity further weakens their incentives. 
 
Similarly, the cost-benefit analysis of diagnostics, in some cases, (for example malaria) does 
not always favor their large scale use. For instance, if the cost of diagnostics is high, a 
planner with limited budget who does not internalize the long term cost of resistance would 
not realize the benefits from their use. 
 
Some countries have shown reluctance to adopt new innovative drugs or vaccines quickly 
into their national programs due to the high costs of retraining and the reputational risks 
from use of drug and vaccine technologies that have yet to be rolled out by other countries 
in the region. 
 
Table 4: Incentives of National Buyers  
 
Select new innovative drugs for inclusion in national essential drugs list  MEDIUM 
Select high quality products and combination therapies  STRONG 
Recommend multiple first line therapies  WEAK 
Procure and promote the use of diagnostic kits  WEAK 
Influence optimal prescribing through provider education  STRONG 14 
 
 
Private Importers, Wholesalers and Pharmacists   
 
Similarly, private importers, wholesalers and pharmacists also face the costs resulting from 
stocking a wider assortment of drugs for higher treatment heterogeneity. Their stocking 
decisions are based on the annual demand, price and margin of the treatment option and the 
willingness to pay (WTP) of the end-patients. 
 
















The private wholesalers and distributors have a weak incentive to stock and promote the use 
of diagnostics or to maintain stocks to enable treatment heterogeneity. This results from the 
margins being low and the willingness-to-pay for diagnostics being lower than that for drugs 
(Naing et. al, 2000) 
 
Table 5: Incentives of Private Importers/Wholesalers/Pharmacists 
 
Select and stock quality products  MEDIUM 
Stock and promote the use of diagnostics  WEAK 
Stock a larger variety of treatment options  WEAK 
Ensure affordability of new products  MEDIUM 




Global Technical Agencies  
 
Technical agencies such as the WHO help countries select their essential drugs list and 
influence policy recommendations, which may impact drug resistance in multiple ways. The 
inclusion of a drug in their recommended treatment options are driven primarily by factors 
such as scientific committee assessments, robustness of safety and efficacy data, resistance 
surveillance and affordability in the market. In some cases such as rapid diagnostic tests, the 15 
 
global technical agencies also have to consider the risks from false negatives in 
recommending treatment guidelines. There is also a non-negligible cost associated with 
creating a communication campaign and redesigning training material every time a treatment 
guideline is changed. Thus, global technical agencies do not always have the incentive to 
recommend treatments and guidelines which may work towards countering drug resistance. 
The global technical agencies are conservative in their approach, and rightfully so, given the 
reputational and patient risks from issuing incorrect guidelines. Similarly, global technical 
agencies do not currently have the incentives to recommend a large variety of first line 
treatments for each disease. 
 















Table 6: Incentives of Global Technical Agencies 
 
Recommend inclusion of new products on essential drugs lists  MEDIUM 
Promote the use of diagnostics through policy recommendations  MEDIUM 
Encourage prevention , infection control and immunization coverage  STRONG 
Recommend a larger variety of first-line treatments to countries  WEAK 
Influence optimal usage through provider and patient education  STRONG 
 
National Quality Regulators 
 










Effective regulation of drugs is a key component in ensuring quality of drugs and their 
rational use. The unregulated supply of drugs or poor quality of drugs can accelerate the 
development of drug-resistant strains of infectious diseases. Drug regulatory authorities 
engage in licensing and product registration; inspection of manufacturing, warehousing and 
dispensing facilities; post marketing surveillance; and control of drug promotion and 
advertising.  
Typically, drug regulatory authorities receive some degree of support from the government 
budget, and the remaining part is financed through registration fees. The level of the 
registration fees must be commensurate with the size of the market, and make it sufficiently 
profitable for the manufacturer or its agent to register the product. Prohibitively high 
registration fees lead to fewer products registered in the country and decrease treatment 
heterogeneity. 
 
Table 7: Incentives of National Quality Regulators 
 
Ensure the availability of a wide variety of treatment options  STRONG 
Ensure quality products throughout the supply chain  STRONG 
De-register old and obsolete products  MEDIUM 
Expedite approval of new products  MEDIUM 
Require manufacturers to collect and report data on distribution, import and export of 
anti-infectives  WEAK 
 
 
Drug regulatory authorities have poor incentives to ensure that manufacturers report data on 
types of anti-infectives produced, imported and sold in their country. This data can be 
crucial to understanding drug resistance but currently does not exist in a systemic manner. 
This is not a mandate clearly laid for drug regulatory authorities. Apart from that, drug 
regulatory authorities do not face an incentives issue, but rather a severe capacity constraint, 
in their ability to monitor the quality of drugs dispensed. In some cases, commercial and 
trade lobbies influence the decisions of the drug regulatory authority, and it is, thus, 




Prescribers and Dispensers 
 
Chart 10: Prescriber’s and Dispenser’s Decision Model 
 
 
Private dispensing clinics, which are an important source of medicines outside the public 
sector for certain diseases such as diarrhea and respiratory tract infections, often have a 
multi-stream revenue model from fixed consultation fees, margins from drug dispensing, and 
income from diagnosis. Their prescribing and pricing choices are, thus, driven by the 
patient’s willingness to pay for each of these. The WTP varies significantly, with higher WTP 
for treatment than for fixed fees or diagnostics. This creates a system of perverse incentives 
at the dispensing clinic and prevents optimal prescribing. Also, prescribers select treatment 
based on patient’s perceived affordability and a perceived availability in the market. The 
prescriber’s perceived price of treatment is not always the true market price and also the 
availability may be different from the perceived availability (information asymmetry on price 
for the prescriber).  
 
It is also interesting to understand the prescriber’s incentives related to treatment based on 
confirmed diagnosis.  When a patient presents with symptoms that could be caused by 
different type of infections (e.g. malaria or pneumonia) the health care providers can either 
prescribe a therapy based on her based judgment or wait until a diagnostic test confirms the 
nature of disease. The decision to prescribe or dispense a treatment immediately gives the 
patient something tangible to take away from the visit and thus makes her have a better 
perception of the health care provider. Similar incentives govern the prescription of broad 
spectrum antibiotics over narrow spectrum antibiotics. Thus in the absence of quick and 
cheap diagnostic methods, prescribers in many low income environments do not have an 
incentive to await detailed diagnosis before prescribing. This factor differentiates low income 
markets from middle and high income markets where prescribers may realize 
income/revenue share from diagnosis or in some cases have a high risk of liability if they 
prescribe without confirmed diagnosis. 
 18 
 
In many developing countries, the prescribers have little ability to update their knowledge 
about new treatment options as there is no concept of Continuing Medical Education 
(CME) nor are there sales representatives who educate the prescribers about new treatment 
options. The prescribers face a huge opportunity cost of learning about new treatment 
options and changes in indications for specific products. Also, given the prescriber’s reward 
structure, they have no incentives to expend effort in educating patients about infection 
control measures. 
 
Table 8: Incentives of Prescribers and Dispensers 
 
Appropriate use of diagnostics  VARIES 
Educate patient/care giver about dosage, adherence etc.  MEDIUM 
Educate patients on the importance of measures to prevent infection, such as 
immunization, vector control, use of bednets, etc.  WEAK 




Patients and Care-givers 
  




The patient or care-giver’s choice model of where to seek treatment largely influences the 
type and quality of treatment and advice he/she will receive. Thus, it becomes critical to 
understand the relative importance of spatial access and convenience factors vs. prescribing 
fees and other cost factors in the patient’s treatment-seeking choices. Also, in cases where 
there is a social or private insurance system in place, the varied reimbursement rates for 
prescriber fees, diagnosis costs, and treatment costs can influence the patient and prescriber 
choice of diagnosis vs. presumptive treatment. Patients have weak incentives to engage in 
infection control activities primarily because of “informational blindspots” (the prescriber 19 
 
does not educate them well on these). Information about the benefits and operational 
modalities of infection control is limited, with public health messages often being the only 
source.  
In addition to the rational economic incentives that were elicited here, in many cases, cultural 
norms and other factors influence the patient’s decision model. Acknowledging that it is not 
easy to understand these and they vary from region to region, the above schematic illustrates 
several of the factors that patients and care givers account for in their decision model for 
obtaining treatment. 
Table 9: Incentives of Patients and Care-Givers 
 
Select the right prescriber/dispenser (self-medication vs. clinic etc.)  MEDIUM 
Optimal dosage and adherence  WEAK 
Make or influence the right choice of drug  STRONG 




3 Recommendations for Policy Intervention  
 
Acknowledging that complex institutions such as the pharmaceutical supply chain in 
developing countries change slowly and celebrate incremental advances, a set of 
recommendations are presented in this section that attempt to remedy the incentives 
misalignments highlighted in the previous sections.  The recommendations chosen are based 
on two criteria: practicality and the ability to rectify more than one incentive misalignment.  
Many of these recommendations would require further analysis to be translated into 
implementable actions. 
Create a science clearing house for resistance related technologies 
There exist clear opportunities to counter the progression of drug resistance through 
resistance-slowing drugs and other technologies. However, profit-driven originator 
pharmaceutical companies may not have the incentives for developing such new drugs, 
vaccines, and diagnostics. Smaller biotech companies and large generic manufacturers may 
have better incentives to develop and market these technologies, as many large generic 
manufacturers eager to enter into the innovation space are more willing to take risks on 
technologies with smaller market size if they can find opportunities to in-license such 
products. However, at present there exists no clear platform which can help facilitate such 
technology transfer. 
 
Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) such as MMV (Medicines for Malaria Venture) 
and DNDi (Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative) have successfully demonstrated how 
mid to late-stage research from academic and pharmaceutical research laboratories can be 
leveraged to generate a healthy portfolio of new drugs. A “science clearing house,” which 
helps unearth all early stage candidates with resistance susceptibility benefits and shares this 
information with interested biotech, smaller pharmaceutical companies, large generic 
manufacturers, and donors looking to move them forward will facilitate a bigger portfolio of 
anti-infectives and other technologies. In addition to technology identification and matching, 20 
 
the clearing house ideally could also play some role in contractual and legal issues pertaining 
to out-licensing, thereby reducing the associated transaction costs. This would reduce the 
disincentives for pharmaceutical companies who come across candidates with interesting 
properties from a drug resistance standpoint but can neither follow them through the 
development process nor out-license them due to the lack of a clear, expedited and cost-
efficient mechanism to do so. 
 
The clearing house could be organized as an online workspace which connects all 
researchers and funders – in pharmaceutical or biotech companies, academia, government, 
generic manufacturers, NGOs and donors – working on or interested in potential 
technology candidates with resistance-slowing or reversing potential. The clearing house 
would  allow partners to evaluate and share information and create a forum that promotes 
communication, collaboration and efficient information dissemination about resistance 
related technologies in discovery and pre-clinical stages. International donors and funders of 
global health research would be the likely candidates to establish such a clearing house, with 
much of the early content populated by academic, public sector and non-profit researchers. 
There are a growing number of examples of web-based marketplaces.  With broad buy-in 
from companies, academics and non-profits, U.S.-based Collaborative Drug Discovery 
(CDD) uses a for-profit, subscription model to attract collaborators .  It has recently 
received funding from the Gates Foundation to make its platform freely available for TB 
researchers.  Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) employs a completely open source 
platform for researchers and developers of drugs solely for neglected diseases.  With initial 
funding from the Indian government, OSDD creates collaborations between academic and 
government researchers that have accelerated scientific activity, such as gene sequencing.  
The incentives to use new tools for research collaboration are clear: laboratory researchers 
and product developers seek greater opportunities to move their ideas beyond the 
laboratory; companies and funders may find the opportunity to lower transactions costs of 
searching for in-licensing and financing drug and other technology candidates.  
Strengthen capacity of national drug regulatory authorities to carry out inspection 
and post-marketing surveillance 
Drug regulatory authorities in most developing (and also developed) countries are focused 
more on licensing, product registration and marketing approval rather than on facility 
inspection, post-marketing surveillance and monitoring.  Thus, there is little check on 
unlicensed manufacturers, importers, wholesalers and retailers who sell counterfeits and/or 
products of unknown quality. External budgetary support to drug regulatory authorities can 
provide them with an increased ability to ensure that only high quality drugs are available and 
proper dispensing practices are followed. In the absence of such support, the regulatory 
authorities of most developing countries remain resource-constrained and unable to carry 
out facility inspection or quality control tests at points of manufacture, storage or dispensing. 
 
Create a global umbrella organization for quality-accredited drug franchise shops in 
developing countries 
Private dispensers and clinics play an important role in providing diagnoses, the correct drug 
treatment and appropriate dosing advice; however, their incentives are not aligned to carry 
out these activities optimally, and they do not internalize any of the social costs of drug 21 
 
resistance. Drug regulatory authorities have the mandate and incentives to ensure that drug 
quality is high across the supply chain and good dispensing practices are followed at all 
points of drug dispensing; however, their reach and capacity to monitor a fast-growing 
market of private providers is fairly limited in most developing countries. Drug dispensing 
franchise networks have emerged in many countries that help maintain consistent quality 
standards through large networks of geographically dispersed drug outlets. Such franchise 
networks scale well, and, in addition to guaranteeing good drug quality and dispensing 
advice, they achieve economies of scale in distribution, information systems, and operational 
management. This model has been used with reasonable success in Ghana (GSMF Care 
Shops), Kenya (CFW Shops) and Tanzania (ADDO shops) to achieve the dual objective of 
improving access to drugs, while maintaining the high quality of drugs and dispensing. 
 
In addition to ensuring the high quality of drugs and other products available, these 
franchised drug outlets can also engage in other efforts to decrease information asymmetries 
and provide incentives for rational use behavior.  For example, these drug outlets can use 
resistance-specific checklists for employee adherence during each consumer interaction.  
And they can engage in drug resistance information campaigns on both sides of the counter: 
requiring dispensers to attend continuing professional development courses and engaging in 
consumer education and outreach to pass that information along both formally (public 
sessions) and informally (day-to-day interactions). 
 
While the franchise model has proven to be a scalable way to ensure the optimal choice of 
drugs, quality of drugs, and dispensing and dosing practices to counter drug resistance, to 
this day, these initiatives have been small in scale and restricted to limited geographies. The 
creation of a global umbrella organization which sets the “meta operating principles” for the 
franchises and ensures the rational dispensation of high quality drugs could foster the 
proliferation of these quality-accredited drug dispensing outlets and clinics. This organization 
needs to create a global brand of quality for drug dispensing and work to improve the role of 
the drug regulatory authorities as the guardians of quality in the distribution chain.  
 
Mandate drug regulatory authorities to collect and report data on distribution, 
import and export of anti-infectives 
Currently, there is very little information available on the quantity and type of anti-infectives 
dispensed in the developing world. Metrics that look at population demographics, disease 
incidence and anti-infective consumption are essential to understanding and proactively 
managing the development of drug resistance. Such metrics can only be developed when 
there is accurate data on the volume of anti-infectives sold in each country. If these data are 
collected with sufficient demographic granularity, researchers can use it with resistance 
surveillance data to better understand the factors that contribute most to the development of 
resistance. Admittedly, this is an ambitious objective, but regions such as ECOWAS, where 
some degree of coordination exists across national drug regulatory authorities, would be a 
good place to jump-start such an initiative. In addition to being able to better understand the 
development of drug resistance, such data will also provide numerous extra benefits,  such 
as: better understanding of the markets in general, better track and trace ability for anti-
infectives, and a more stringent control on anti-infectives of spurious quality. 
 
Create incentive structures to promote enhanced use of diagnostics 22 
 
Unnecessary drug use could be prevented and a shift to more targeted resistance-friendly 
treatments would be facilitated if rapid diagnostic tests were available and affordable, and if 
there were clear financial incentives for health care providers and patients for their use. In 
the last decade technological investments have led to the availability of several new rapid 
diagnostic tests .Despite the availability of point of care diagnostics, due to the lack of 
incentives for national health programs, distribution channel players and the 
prescribers/dispenser to adopt these technologies, their uptake has been fairly limited. The 
willingness to pay for diagnostics is lower than that for treatments, which results in weak 
incentives for the actors involved in distribution and dispensing to promote the use of 
diagnostic technologies. Although the cost of some diagnostic technologies – like the RDT 
for malaria – has fallen, they still remain beyond the WTP threshold of end-patients and 
prescribers. This gap can be managed through higher international financing and a focus on 
diagnostics that can be used in primary care settings. Access to diagnostics remains an under 
researched area, and new models of delivery such as bundled pricing for diagnostic 
technologies should be studied. 
Better educate national, social or employer-run insurance and revolving drug fund 
managers in developing countries on the causes, impacts and strategies to contain 
drug resistance  
In countries where there exists a social insurance scheme (e.g. Ghana, Kyrgyzstan), a 
reasonable penetration of employer-provided insurance or health care (Zambia with copper 
mines, Ghana with gold mines and cocoa plantations), or a large revolving drug fund 
(Sudan), these systems can be used as points of high leverage to ensure that dispensers and 
prescribers offer “resistance-friendly” products and place adequate emphasis on infection 
control. This could be achieved by creating a forum where all insurance or revolving drug 
fund managers in developing countries can come together to share their experiences. The 
forum could be used to emphasize messages about how payers can leverage their buying 
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